A rough draft of a published article
As I mentioned in a 19 December 2016 blog post, the Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History published an article of mine entitled "The Royal Indian Navy Mutiny of 1946: Nationalist Competetion and Civil-Military Relations in Postwar India." Here is a link to the online version of the article.
I owe a special thanks to professors Ami Pedahzur, Wm. Roger Louis, and Zoltan Barany for their comments and advice in bringing this article to publication.
My author's agreement with the publisher allows me to place an unrevised, unedited version of the article here on my website. I know that people without library access will be unable to read the article unless I post it here, so I have decided to go ahead and paste a rough, early draft of the essay into this site.
The following text is close to the version that I submitted to the editor, but has not had the benefit of peer-review or extensive professional revisions. The draft below lacks adequate discourse with the social history of Bombay, the military history of the Indian military, and the Transfer of Power series published by Oxford University Press. The bibliography is also shorter and less comprehensive than what can be found in the final article.
Still, some people might find it helpful.
I owe a special thanks to professors Ami Pedahzur, Wm. Roger Louis, and Zoltan Barany for their comments and advice in bringing this article to publication.
My author's agreement with the publisher allows me to place an unrevised, unedited version of the article here on my website. I know that people without library access will be unable to read the article unless I post it here, so I have decided to go ahead and paste a rough, early draft of the essay into this site.
The following text is close to the version that I submitted to the editor, but has not had the benefit of peer-review or extensive professional revisions. The draft below lacks adequate discourse with the social history of Bombay, the military history of the Indian military, and the Transfer of Power series published by Oxford University Press. The bibliography is also shorter and less comprehensive than what can be found in the final article.
Still, some people might find it helpful.
The Royal Indian Navy Mutiny of 1946
Nationalist competition and civil-military relations in postwar India
In February 1946, as the wartime powers of the British military continued their slow disarmament, Indian nationalist aspirations spilled into Bombay's military ports and harbors during the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) mutiny. The strike proved to be a pivotal testing ground for the means and methods of Indian independence. The strike ultimately involved thousands of sailors--low of rank and out of depth--and took on more interesting dimensions as nationalist parties struggled to secure a foothold in postwar India. Documents depicting these events occupy only some eighty pages in the Towards Freedom volumes, but the mutiny nevertheless bore an especially large impact on two key aspects of the transition towards Indian independence: the competition for power between Congress and Communists, and civilian control over the Indian military.
Mutinies, as a political problem, represent a loss of control within the military's strict hierarchical structure, and signal a danger to the state's ability to control its armed forces. They typically occur on a small scale, and during times of low morale. Rarely, mutinies spill into significant bloodshed, such as the Indian revolt of 1857. In terms of character and danger to the state, the RIN mutiny of 1946 more nearly approached the Invergordon mutiny of 1931, wherein roughly a thousand low ranking British sailors refused to work due to an impending pay-cut of twenty-five percent. In both Invergordon and Bombay, the mutineers edged closer to an industrial strike rather than a violent insurrection. Whereas the Invergordon mutiny involved critically important vessels such as the Hood and the Nelson, the RIN mutiny mainly took place on shore establishments, though once again with low ranking ratings[1] leading the way. Most of the mutineers intended the strike to redress relatively minor grievances; nationalist aspirations represented a secondary concern. The mutiny of 1946, nevertheless, threatened the British with the loss of control over forces that played a crucial role in British victories in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe during the Second World War. The Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, Claude Auchinleck, and the naval chain-of-command responded firmly to the mutineers and demanded their peaceful capitulation. Violence within the ranks never amounted to more than a handful of casualties. Most of the bloodshed surrounding the mutiny occurred in the streets of Bombay during a Communist hartal. Seeking to rekindle a close relationship with the British raj, the Muslim League and National Congress repudiated the Communists and the hartal, and strongly advised the naval ratings to surrender. The firm opposition to any violence surrounding the mutiny pointed the way towards an independent India in which civilian government maintained a steady hand on the reins of military power.
Congress and the Muslim League used the mutiny to enhance their reputation as legitimate purveyors of liberal justice and liberal values, intent on working within a constitutional framework to establish Indian independence. They created political space between their own left-wing contingents, and the actions of the Communists. The Communists viewed the RIN mutiny as an opportunity to drive Indian independence in a more revolutionary direction; they called for a Bombay-wide hartal in support of the mutineers. For a short time, the Communists garnered widespread support from Bombay students and workers, regardless of religious affiliation. Hundreds died in clashes with police and soldiers; police stations burned, buses overturned, and life ground to a halt. Congress and the Muslim League quickly distanced themselves from the Bombay hartal and the RIN mutiny. Consequently, however, they also distanced themselves from the mass demonstrators that responded to the Communist call for action. Congress leaders, including the socialist-leaning Jawaharlal Nehru and capitalist-leaning Sadar Vallabhbhai Patel, made no attempt to lead the students, workers, and naval ratings to revolutionary victory. Congress and the Muslim League left the Communists out in the cold, but at the cost of turning off the heat lamp for the demonstrators as well. United Hindu-Muslim political demonstrations became a dull instrument for social change; future demonstrations lacked a united Hindu-Muslim front, and became increasingly communal in character.
Early Signs of Dissension within the Ranks
There were clear signs of military discontent in the months leading up to the strike of the naval ratings.[2] In Bombay, the Free Press Journal reported that tensions arose at a Royal Indian Air Force camp between airmen and the camp commander over the wearing of civilian clothes in the dining facility.[3] On a more serious note, American journalists reported the desertion of hundreds of Indian soldiers in Indonesia, where "British troops [were] disgusted with the dirty work of shooting Indonesian patriots."[4] Both these events occurred in an atmosphere already fraught with tension due to the impeding court martial trials for the soldiers of the Indian National Army (INA). The INA consisted of Indian-born British soldiers captured by Japanese forces, who then volunteered in small numbers to turn their arms on the forces of the British Empire. The 1945 death of INA leader Subhas Chandra Bose left the INA rudderless, but not politically defenseless--recently released Congress leaders rallied to protect the soldiers of the former president of Congress. This show of support for the INA helped set the stage for the coming RIN mutiny. INA soldiers and Quit India participants were considered heroes in the streets of urban India. Loyal members of the armed forces were considered boot lickers.[5] Impending demobilization and high civilian unemployment created an atmosphere of increasing tension within all branches of the Indian military, but especially in the newer, less conservative branches, the navy and the air force.[6] These tense conditions stacked atop the racial discrimination that was always at play in the armed forces. The British soldiers received better pay than the Indian soldiers, and they received better food and facilities. When the Indians protested, their officers invited them to gamely accept the difference in treatment as a competition between rival military units. The officers prodded the Indian ranks to prove they could do more with less; the efforts of the soldiers, the officers suggested, would result in equal treatment after the next training exercise--or failing that, the next battle--or if nothing else then after the war. Equality became an ever-receding goal line, and the Indians could never cross it.[7] Frustration simmered throughout the Second World War, and boiled over in 1946.
The tension found clearest expression at a moderately-sized naval base that housed and trained signal operators along the shores of Bombay. One of those operators was D.C. Butt, an aspiring nationalist and five-year veteran of the Royal Indian Navy. At the end of the war, he found himself redeployed to the very naval establishment where he had received his initial training: the HMIS Talwar. He was frustrated with the discrimination he had encountered throughout the war. He met many a kindred spirit in the Talwar canteen. "Without quite realising it," he later wrote, "I became a conspirator."[8] Dutt and his friends secretly assumed the name Azad Hindi (Free Indians) in a nod to both the INA (Azad Hind Fauj) and the Indian nationalist movement in general. During its brief four month existence, the circle of conspirators never grew beyond a dozen sympathizers and twenty regulars.[9] But they eventually managed to have an outsized impact on the Royal Indian Navy.
The first act of Talwar sabotage came on Navy Day, 1 December 1945. The RIN commanders wanted to open Talwar to the public for the first time in history. But on the morning of 1 December, officers found the parade ground "littered with burnt flags and bunting; brooms and buckets were prominently displayed from the masthead. Political slogans in foot-high letters were staring from every wall: 'Quite India', 'Down With the Imperialists', 'Revolt Now', 'Kill the British'."[10] The officers and petty officers cleaned the Talwar as best they could before the public arrived. The mild success of the vandalism (and the weak response of the officers) left the small group of conspirators hungry for more.
The weakness of the response came in part due to the military's awareness of changing political conditions throughout India. Commander-in-Chief Auchinleck had rung in the New Year with a letter to all commanding officers wherein he implored them to remember the importance of cooperation between India and Britain, and the need for a smooth changeover to self-rule; he also emphasized the need for tolerance, equality, and goodwill between service members, all of which could provide a 'firm base' for the transition.[11] Auchinleck may not have liked the idea of letting go of India, but he took steps to prepare his military as best he could. This was partly to ensure the stability of a critical British interest. But stability and tolerance would also pave the way for British officers to continue to serve in the independent Indian Army--a hope which eventually came to fruition.[12] In the near-term, however, it perhaps placed his commanders on uneasy grounds for enforcing discipline. Unable to catch the guilty party, and unwilling to castigate the mass of sailors, the officers simply increased the pace of demobilization, effectively hoping to push the conspirators overboard before they could cause any more trouble.[13] The conspirators thus rapidly dwindled in number, but those remaining (including B.C. Dutt) remained enthusiastic for nationalistic action.
As it happened, Auchinleck[14] was scheduled to visit the HMIS Talwar on 2 February 1946. As is often hoped for among general officers, the men at Talwar were, ironically, thrilled at the prospect of Auchinleck's visit. The possibility of being in the presence of their C-in-C emboldened B.C. Dutt and his fellow conspirators to take strong action. Sentries, however, barred the path of any unified vandalism. Thus the conspirators operated in even smaller groups than before, but still succeeded in their task. At dusk on 1 February, naval ratings quickly painted 'Jai Hind' and 'Quit India' on the platform from which Auchinleck was to take the Talwar's salute.[15] In the middle of the night, B.C. Dutt added a few smaller slogans. Then he used a bottle of glue to paste leaflets on barrack walls. In a touch that spoke to the complexity of RIN culture, the leaflets quoted the Bible. "No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other; or else he will hold to the one and despise the other," Mathew 6:24.[16] The sentries discovered the vandalism before sunrise. B.C. Dutt was caught with glue on his hands, and the bottle and leaflets in his pockets. "My locker was opened for inspection," Dutt recalled. "[The officers discovered] mimeographed copies of 'Indian Mutiny, 1857' by Asoka Mehta, my diaries, the copies of the leaflet I had distributed and some incriminating letters." In the history of mutinies, never had the clumsy guilt of the mutineer appeared so naively innocent.
B.C. Dutt's almost comical capture soon resulted in unintended consequences for all involved. The capture transformed a bashful conspirator into a reckless catalyst. He claimed sole credit for all acts of vandalism. He announced his status as a political prisoner. He demanded a bench to rest on, and a chair to sit on. In quick succession, he faced down five interrogating officers, including a Rear-Admiral.[17] Outside of Dutt's confinement cell, the vandalism continued. And on 8 February, Commander King, the British officer in command at Talwar, lost his cool when he heard naval ratings "catcall some WRINs (Women in the RIN)." King lashed out at his men. The context for King's anger appears in Dutt's memoir, but drops out of the news reports (and official reports) appearing in the Towards Freedom collection.[18]
Meanwhile, people were dying in the streets of urban India. In New Delhi, Calcutta, and Bombay, massive marches continued to celebrate the soldiers of the INA, and nationalist leaders continued to harangue the British efforts to punish the offenders. That winter, the ratings made their mark with glue and paint, while the nationalist leaders made their mark with words. But the civilians of India painted the streets with their own blood in scores of clashes with the British authorities.[19] And for the first time, the ratings were about to touch that blood with their own hands.
The Strike Begins
And so the true spark for the naval mutiny began on 8 February, and not on a ship, but upon the shore establishment Talwar. As eventually reported in the Free Press Journal on 18 February, the “insulting behavior” of Commanding Officer King infuriated the naval ratings under his command with taunts of "Sons of Coolies" and "Sons of Bitches."[20] Anger accumulated, and a hunger strike commenced on 18 February.[21] Dutt's memoir adds the phrase "Sons of bloody junglees."[22] Embarking on a hunger strike, the ratings embraced tactics favored in the nationalist movement. Now the officers on Talwar took the strike seriously, and quickly minimized the risk of violence and confusion through the disbursement of non-striking personnel away from the establishment.[23] What began at Talwar quickly spread throughout the harbors of Bombay. Some of the most significant actions took place at Castle Barracks, one of the shore establishments located near the Talwar. On the morning of the 19 February--the same day on which Whitehall announced a Cabinet Mission to India--the Castle Barracks ratings received newspaper accounts of the strike from the Free Press Journal. They saw B.C. Dutt on the front page. The headlines read “Indian Naval Men in City on Hunger Strike;” “Insulting Behavior of C.O. Infuriates the Ratings;” “Authorities Get Panicky;” and “Communications between Indian and Abroad Dislocated”[24] The newspaper accounts set off arguments among the ratings. Interestingly, the poor quality of their breakfast seemed to arouse the strongest sentiment. The navy offered them “just what we have been eating ever since we joined the service—foul-smelling, half-cooked and full of stones and husks”[25]. The ratings rejected the meal, and took action. They seized vehicles and spilled into the streets of Bombay. Some drove, some ran, some marched. All headed towards the Talwar. Their momentum drew 3,000 ratings together. The ratings took a largely non-violent approach to the mutiny. They even formed a Central Naval Strike Committee in anticipation of negotiations. B.C. Dutt assumed a supporting role on the committee.[26] All the members were under twenty-six years of age.[27] Some were Muslims, other Hindu.[28] At the conclusion of the initial meetings and rallies at Talwar, the naval ratings dispersed, and for the most part returned to their ships and shore establishments.[29]
The committee quickly generated a coherent list of demands. These demands suggest the precipitating conditions that led to the strike. First, they demanded the release of all political prisoners, to include the soldiers of the INA. Second, unspecified action against Commander King for ill-treatment and insulting language. Third, the speedy demobilization of RIN personnel, but with provisions for peacetime employment. Fourth, a revision of pay-scale, such that RIN personnel earned as much those in the regular Royal Navy. Fifth, adjusted pay allowances for family and children. Sixth, better food. Seventh, no refund of clothing kit at the time of discharge--in other words, allow the ratings to keep all their uniforms upon completion of their service. Eighth, better treatment from the officers. Ninth, withdrawal of Indian forces from Indonesia.[30]
Wider political concerns bookended the demands, but the core of their concerns regarded equality of pay between the Royal Navy (RN) and the Royal Indian Navy, as well as direct address to the needs of the Bombay shore establishments. The strikers refused to negotiate without the intervention of nationalist leaders, especially Aruna Asaf Ali, a popular Bombay political leader, and the wife of Asaf Ali, a man who figured to become the first Defense Minister in the new Indian government.[31] The ratings broadcast their action to ships throughout the Bombay area. At the end of 18 February, some 1,100 men on the establishment had joined the strike.[32] The next day, eleven additional shore establishments also joined the strike. The ratings boarded the twenty-some naval ships in Bombay, and flew the Indian tri-color flag rather than the Union Jack.[33] This brought the total number of ratings involved to around 20,000, though some estimates place the actual number of strikers at a much lower number—perhaps fewer than 15,000. Thus, a strike that began with a handful of veterans quickly spread to thousands. Many of these were raw recruits.
Aruna Asaf Ali, a member of Congress whom the strikers cited as their preferred correspondent from the nationalist movement, responded in due course. On 20 February she saluted the ratings for refusing to “submit sheepishly [to] the hectoring and swearing of their British rulers."[34] Confident of broad support for the strike, she encouraged the ratings to maintain their stance, seek further guidance from nationalist leaders, and undertake disciplined collective action. “Firmness, discipline and unity on the [part] of the strikers and the pressure of public opinion should result in a successful conclusion to this spontaneous strike."[35]
The ratings adhered to Aruna Asaf Ali’s guidelines for discipline and collective action--at least for the time being--but the political context darkened even as more military personnel fell in with the strikers. Some eighty ratings specializing in signal communications joined the strike from the naval headquarters in New Delhi on February 20.[36] Members of the Royal Indian Air Force joined in the strike on the 21st.[37] The air force strikers repeated the RIN demand for equal pay to that of the RAF. Nevertheless, "the heady wine of freedom had run down noticeably" among the naval units of Bombay.[38] The strikers notified the Free Press Journal that they feared the government intended to deprive them of food. (Apparently the hunger-strike was stopped soon after it began on the 18th, or else not widespread.) In a move that initially baffled the ratings, FOCRIN John Henry Godfrey, admiral, offered to accept the ratings' "request" for better food.[39] The authorities even dropped off a truck of food at Castle Barracks.[40] Yet at the same time, General Sir Rob Lockhart, leader of Southern Command, assumed responsibility for subduing the mutiny. He deployed Indian troops--a battalion of the Mahratta Regiment--to herd the mutineers off the streets and into their quarters.[41] No one was hurt on the first day of Lockhart's operation, but that would soon change.[42] Through runners and telephone calls, the ratings began to discover that "their heroes, the leaders of the liberation movement, had no use for them."[43] The ratings in Bombay grew apprehensive as British Indian Army soldiers formed pickets around their facilities. Still, the Central Strike Committee relayed to their comrades that they should remain non-violent.
B.C. Dutt, S. Banerjee, British military reports, and Indian government reports all differ as to who exactly made the next move; but in all versions, violence occurred at Castle Barracks.[44] [45] According to official reports (which most nationalist leaders accepted), ratings at Castle Barracks attempted to break through Lockhart's picket on 21 February. The pickets repulsed the ratings, and the ratings took up arms and fired on the pickets. The pickets--Army trained--fired back at the naval ratings with rifles, Lewis Guns, and Tommy Guns. Both sides tossed grenades.[46] According to Dutt and Banerjee, the violence began with a prepared assault against the ratings. With the onset of violence, the Central Strike Committee moved from the Talwar to the HMIS Narbada, a sloop, and the most modern ship in the harbor at that time. The committee told all ships to prepare, if necessary, to take up battle stations throughout Bombay. They sent the message without using any attempt at code. The British easily intercepted the message.[47]
National Politics, Local Consequences
The ratings expected broad support from the leaders of the Indian independence movement, but that support never fully materialized. From Congress and the Muslim League, the ratings only received words of sympathy and promises of legal assistance. Demarcating the severe limits of support for the RIN uprising required a test in the streets, newspapers, and radio programs of Bombay. The Communists pushed for just such a test. As in Calcutta one month prior,[48] the street demonstrations that ostensibly supported the revolutionary action of nationalist soldiers soon burned bright-red as the Communists rallied the urban masses towards their own vision of an independent India.
Tensions within Congress, and between Congress and the Communists, soon became apparent. Gangadhar Adhikari, a member of the Communist Party's Central Committee, called for a one-day general strike "in all shops, schools, colleges, and mills as a mark of ... disapproval of Government repression ...."[49] But even as the Communists called for hartal, Congress leaders like S.K. Patil, Mohatma Gandhi, and Vallabhbhai Patel appealed for peace, order, and normalcy.[50] Patil, General Secretary of the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee (BPCC), led the local chamber in passing a resolution in support for the RIN ratings. The BPCC stayed in constant contact with the ratings, and urged the authorities to redress their concerns. Yet at the same time (and on the same day as Adhikari's call for hartal) he noted that "some interested persons, wanting to take advantage of the situation or incapable of realising the consequences of their action, have asked the mills in the city to close as a part of general hartal;" he counseled Bombay that such actions did harm than good.[51] "It is our sad experience every time, that when the atmosphere is tense the hartals or the general suspension of business accentuate the tension rather than relieve it, and they afford an excellent opportunity to hooligans and irresponsible elements to intimidate people and lead them to violence..."[52] Congress knew that the raj was on the way out, and that they had an opportunity to play a decisive role in the transfer of power. Congress in 1946 could ill afford a military-led insurrection that might cost them their place at the negotiating table, or a delay of the transfer. Nor could Congress risk the annoyance (or the destruction) of the Indian capital that formed their base of support. The sudden burst of patriotism from the mutinous, low-ranking ratings came too late in the raj's lifespan to convince the Congress leaders of its good effects. After all, the ratings, however low-ranking, were an integral part of the war machine that kept Gandhi, Nehru, and Patel in prison throughout much of the war. From the Muslim League, Jinnah offered his services to redress the grievances of the RIN strikers, but on the condition that they adopt "constitutional, lawful and peaceful methods."[53] Jinnah, and his rivals in Congress, saw little use in calling for hartal or any other popularly-charged sign of support for the naval ratings.
Regardless of the calls of Congress and the Muslim League, a hartal commenced throughout Bombay. Violence followed. The headline in the Free Press Journal read, 'Demonstrators Machinegunned.'[54] The disruptions began on Thursday evening, 22 February, and continued through the next day. Demonstrators set fire to military and police vehicles, constructed roadblocks, and turned over tramcars. Eventually, military rule prevailed throughout the city, but not without opening fire on the crowds with heavy machineguns. The hartal choked the life out of the city, at least for a day, and the streets "presented a desolate and forlorn appearance" with the exception of a rare passing demonstration made of students and laborers. Rioters looted government shops, as well as those of wealthy merchants, such as a wine shop in Cheera Bazar.[55] Thousands of clerks from the Great Indian Peninsula railway walked out in the early afternoon and joined the mill workers and other laborers in the streets.[56] An intelligence report on the following day placed the number of injured in the Bombay riots at 777, with 63 dead; the police also suffered casualties; 37 officers and 93 constables were injured, and two of the constables were killed.
The oral history archives at the Imperial War Museum in London include an account of the street violence from an anonymous, low-ranking British officer who considered himself a socialist.[57] He travelled to Bombay in civilian clothes in hopes of seeing a revolution; after seeing the mutinied ships quietly lining the harbor, he travelled deeper into the streets to be among the crowds of protesting workers. Shortly after his arrival a British Army fifteen-hundred weight truck came around a corner--the protestors threw themselves to the ground and a machine-gun from the back of the truck opened up. Many were wounded, but the officer, as the only white man among the crowd, began to fear a retaliatory lynching, and so he took a train to Sandhurst Rd, near the Communist Party headquarters. As the crowds passed down Sandhurst Rd, the people shouted 'Jai Hind' and 'Ink Zal Ind-Ibd'--Long Live the Revolution. "Talking to the comrades during the afternoon and evening ... they were wondering if this might be signal for revolution." Mutiny played a large role in "communist romanticism," reaching back to the uprising aboard the Russian battleship Potemkin in 1905. The police, in the officer's view, were not making a serious effort to stop the demonstrations, "So it was not inconceivable that a Soviet might be declared and that Bombay might have been in the hands of revolutionary forces and that this might have spread to the whole of India and who knows what might have happened."[58] What in fact actually happened was that Indian National Congress leaders decided that the prospect for revolution must not get out of hand.
As the violence in the streets wound up, the naval ratings wound down. On 22 February, Admiral Godfrey, commander of the Royal Indian Navy, demanded their surrender; he suggested that he would annihilate the RIN rather than let it fall into chaos.[59] The ratings realized that no significant national leader supported their efforts in an unconditional way. They had stumbled into the fight for Indian independence with naive expectations, and now they found they had little stomach for truly radical politics. When their Central Strike Committee failed to produce a national leader that could unequivocally guide the fight, the ratings lost confidence and enthusiasm.[60] Thus, back at the naval yard, the ratings at Castle Barracks surrendered their arms in accordance with the wishes of Vallabhbhai Patel. They attempted to renew the strike on a non-violent basis, and paid their respects to "those brave citizens and workers who have perished or have been injured... at the hands of the British authority."[61] The mutiny also reared its head in Karachi and Calcutta, but was quickly contained in similar fashion.[62] Soon, all the ratings capitulated. Those that played a key role in the strike, like B.C. Dutta, were eventually discharged from the navy, never to return, and never pardoned.
If the ratings found scant hope from the Bombay riots, most nationalist leaders found none at all. Mahatma Gandhi denounced the violence as unholy, even if it represented a united Hindu-Muslim action against the British forces. "A combination between Hindus and Muslims and others," he wrote on 23 February, "for the purpose of violent action is unholy and will lead to and probably is a preparation for mutual violence--bad for India and the world."[63] Not everyone agreed with the Mahatma. Aruna Asaf Ali pushed back against Gandhi on 25 February. She insisted that she would only help bring disturbances to an end if the British military forces withdrew from the city, and the government lifted the ban on meetings.[64] In the halls of the Central Assembly, Congress leadership shuffled the question of enquiries into subcommittees and out of the main chamber; they refused to even address the possibility of refuting any disciplinary actions taken against the mutineers.[65]
With the ratings losing enthusiasm for revolutionary action, the Communist Party quickly sensed the closing of a small window of opportunity. Shripad Amrit Dange, a founding member of the Communist Party in India, alleged a systematic cover-up by the government. He said the violence in the streets of Bombay constitutes "an unprecedented orgy of shootings... even for the British administration of this country."[66] He charged the British with the mass shooting of 250 civilians during the Bombay hartal. He made out the shootings as a class issue, and said they mostly took place in working class areas. "One can understand the Government and its spokesmen raising the cry of hooliganism; but it is distressing to find Congress leaders like Sardar Patel lending support to this interpretation."[67]
Thus far, the difference in action between the Congress and Communists seem clear-cut. But this was not the case. The Towards Freedom collection juxtaposes S.A. Dange's criticisms of Congress with a private letter from Dr Mukund Ramrao Jayakar that offers a local reading of political tensions. In the letter, Jayakar, a member of the Constituent Assembly in India, explained to INA defense lawyer Tej Bahadur Sapru that the disparate actions of the Communists and Congress leaders divulged the presence of subtle nationalist power struggles. "There is a secret rivalry between the Communists and Congressmen," he wrote, "each trying to put the other in the wrong. In yesterday's speech Vallabhbhai almost said, without using so many words, that the trouble was due to the Communists trying to rival the Congress in the manner of leadership."[68] The Communists sought to rally support for the mutineers with a broad call for hartal throughout the city of Bombay. The Communists used the hartal in an attempt to pry the support of the masses away from the hands of Congress. They wagered that initiating a politically potent hartal might grant them enough political momentum to drive the independence movement leftward. Patel, however, firmly repudiated the hartal, and instead concentrated even more political power in the direction of capital-friendly Congressmen. Nehru's biographer, S. Gopal, noted that Patel grew annoyed when socialist-leaning Jawaharlal Nehru came to Bombay to look into the riots for himself.[69] British bureaucrats and Indian business leaders both preferred the orderly calls of capital-friendly Patel to the immoderate fires of revolutionary socialism. Patel's influence proved strong enough to wrestle left-leaning Congress leaders into line, and he effectively discouraged them from showing any support for the actions of the Communists, the rioters, or the ratings. In short, despite the burnt vehicles, tram shelters, and post offices, and despite the massive movement of students and labor, the Communist hartal effectively solidified the collusion between a moderated Congress, Indian capital, and the British government. This was the absolute opposite of the intended effect. Jayakar's letter continued with a celebration of Congress' turn against the naval strikers. "I feel often surprised at the wonderful change which has come over these big Congressmen. No hartals, no meetings[,] no processions, no closing of schools, no defiance... even the Mahatma now says that it is foolish to distrust the intentions of the British."[70] In noting the "secret rivalry" between the Congressmen and Communists, Jayakar actually expected the Communists to make political gains in national politics due to Congress' apparent meekness. These gains never materialized. The Communists continued to excoriate Congress and the British military for their actions against both the naval ratings and the people of Bombay, but to no effect.[71] The Communist denunciation of the Patel-organized surrender also seems to have had no effect.
The view from the Raj
Intelligence bureau reports from the time period show the typical government employee only too happy to distinguish between Communist violence and Congress' moderation. But the political fallout remained uncertain until the smoke cleared. "Congress were against today's hartal and Vallabhbhai Patel was emphatic about this," wrote one intelligence officer, "but the Communists' call for sympathy with the RIN ratings has won the day and the Congress Labour Union has been totally ineffective."[72] A telephone report the next day drew a clear line between Communist and Congress: "Congress advised against the hartal yesterday. The communists however called for hartal and sent representatives distribution leaflets... there is no doubt that the Communists are directly responsible for the trouble."[73] The intelligence reports failed to mention Congress member Aruna Ali Asaf's support for the hartal. Yet any successful mobilization of labor proved short lived. The government curfew on 22 February effectively put an end to the rioting and violence, as well as to any working-class collective action.[74]
Up at the very top, Viceroy Archibald Wavell took the mutiny in stride. Before the onset of the strike, the INA riots in Calcutta on 12 and 13 February firmly held his attention.[75] Wavell described 19 February as "a day of alarms but not excursions."[76] Wavell felt that Auchinleck took the news harder than himself. "Though [Auchinleck] talked about sticking to our principles, he was really hoping hard that I would give a lead to recommend to H.M.G., surrender to public opinion and total abandonment of I.N.A. trials. I refused to play and said we should stick it out. What a cheerful day--prospect or reality of three mutinies and two strikes! However, I got in 18 holes of golf with Pompey Howard in between and played well."[77]
On the 20 February neither Wavell nor Auchinleck acknowledged any interest in giving way to the naval ratings; they hoped to severely punish the ringleaders of the mutiny; they had yet to discover that the mutiny was largely rudderless. When the mutineers fired on their troops, Auchinleck and Wavell coolly refused the notion of any parley with the mutineers.[78] After two months marked by violence throughout the country, Wavell wrote on 27 February of his frustration with Indian political leaders for inciting mass action in the past, but showing little ability to control it in the present. "They have often condemned 'police rule,' but it is at any rate better than student rule or mob rule, as they are beginning to find out."[79]
As winter passed into spring, and spring into summer, the military locked up the 'ringleader' naval ratings, discharged others, and forgave the remainder. It reclaimed nearly all its vessels (and most of its equipment) intact. An exception was the sloop HMIS Hindustan, which had exchanged fire with Indian Army howitzers and required serious repairs.[80] In July the Bombay government advised against public trials of the mutineers. The trials, they felt, would strain the ability of capitalist-minded Congressmen to "maintain ascendency over Congress Socialists who are at present bitterly critical of Vallabhbhai Patel and others for lack of support to the RIN mutineers. Public trials will give Congress Socialists an opportunity to strengthen their influence and this may make future negotiations for Congress participation in Central Government more difficult."[81] Also in July, freshly promoted Field Marshal Auchinleck softened his approach to the RIN participants. Falling in line with Bombay's advice, he opted for the more private (and less stringent) punishments made possible through summary proceedings, rather than the harsher prospects of court martial. He made one exception--Commander King, the commanding officer at Talwar that used racist language, would still undergo court martial for his use of unbecoming language, and his failure to investigate a complaint when brought to his notice.[82]
Conclusion
The mutiny of the naval ratings burst upon the scene of national politics unexpectedly; it set off unintended reverberations that lasted for years. From one perspective, the affair ended tidily, and possibly eased fears of an internal security dilemma within independent India. From another, however, the RIN mutiny put a firm wedge between organized labor and Congress, thereby spoiling the economic plans of Indian socialists for years to come. The RIN mutiny of 1946 thus helped shape conditions depicted in two recent works of outstanding scholarship; each examines different aspects of India's political development: Zoltan Barany's The Solider and the Changing State and Vivek Chibber's Locked in Place. The findings of the present study indicate that neither developmental outcome stemmed from strategic choice, but through happenstance.
Barany argues that Indian democracy benefited from Jawaharlal Nehru's relatively smooth assumption of executive military command at the time of the transfer of power. The Indian Army, still an elite and disciplined force, calmly moved from one master to the next. But this outcome was far from certain prior to the mutiny. The military and Congress, after all, distrusted one another tremendously after standing on opposite sides throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Their opposition to one another hardly represented a promising start for civilian dominance over military affairs, itself an essential precondition for democracy. Curiously, the mutiny played a large role in ensuring civilian dominance over the military. As previously stated, a mutiny represents a threat to a government's ability to control its armed forces. In the case of the 1946 mutiny, however, the actions of Congress and the raj helped cement civilian dominance over military matters, and ensured the welfare of officers in the Indian military. Congress leaders like Patel and Gandhi sought to end the mutiny merely because it represented a threat to the progress of near-term negotiations between Congress and the British government. To ensure the fidelity of a transfer of power, they strove to use their leverage as national leaders to encourage the mutineers to a peaceful, negotiated settlement. The mutineers wanted active leadership, but instead received quiet advice. The mutineers claimed they were behaving in a politically legitimate way; Congress leaders coolly denied the claim. This set a precedent that held strong throughout the subsequent tumultuous decades: in the early years of independent India, military units were not welcome to take independent political action of any kind, thus mitigating their threat to the state. [83]
Second, Congress refused to support the hartal of workers and students; Congress' refusal staunched the confidence of labor-based political actors in India. Indian capital, already strengthened from their output throughout the Second World War, embraced Patel's willingness to quickly end the strike of the naval ratings. In Patel, the capitalists found a leader capable of speaking directly to strikers; Patel was equally capable of keeping the other Congress leaders from going too far in their support of movements that tasted of revolutionary socialism. But Patel's diffusion of the RIN mutiny eventually had far reaching consequences; when it came time to implement Nehru's economic plans, India lacked the confident working class necessary to provide leverage vis-a-vis domestic capital. Congress' actions during the 1946 mutiny, though only intended to ensure a rapid transfer of power, therefore had serious influence on economic outcomes for decades to come.[84]
As D.C. Butt reflected in his own memoirs some forty years ago, "Indian society has so evolved that there is no room for revolution." Indeed, for that fact, fans of moderation might wish to thank an unlikely (and unlucky) group of young men: the Royal Indian Navy mutineers of 1946.[85]
*Afterword: Following his release from jail, D.C. Butt tried to obtain service in the newly independent Indian navy. The navy remembered the blows it took on the chin, and declined his admission. Thereafter, he served as a journalist with the Free Press Journal for many years, and then moved on to advertising. All writers, I think, are either failed revolutionaries or failed sailors at heart; D.C. Butt was both.
Works Cited
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Banerjee, S. (1981). The R.I.N. Strike. New Delhi: People's Publishing House.
J. Baker, ParaData, 'HMIS Hindustan incident,' http://www.paradata.org.uk/content/hmis-hindustan- incident. No date provided.
Barany, Z. D. (2012). The soldier and the changing state: Building democratic armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Bonner, A. (1990). "The Mutiny of the Innocents" in Averting the Apocalypse: Social Movements in India Today. Durham: Duke University Press.
Chawla, M. I. (2011). Wavell and the dying days of the Raj: Britain's penultimate viceroy in India. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
Chibber, V. (2006). Locked in place: State-building and capitalist industrialization in India. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Connell, J. (1959). Auchinleck: A biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck. London: Cassell.
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Dutt, B.C. (1971). The Mutiny of the Innocents. Bombay: Sindhu Publications.
Greenwood, A. (1990). Field-Marshal Auchinleck: A biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck. Witton le Wear, Durham: Pentland Press.
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Sumit Sarkar (2009). Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for independence in India, 1946, Part I. Oxford: Indian Council of Historical Research and Oxford University Press.
Warner, P. (1981). Auchinleck: the lonely soldier. London: Buchan & Enright.
Wavell, A. P. W., & Moon, P. (1973). Wavell: the viceroy's journal. London: Oxford University Press.
Warner, P. (1981). Auchinleck, the lonely soldier. London: Buchan & Enright.
[1] A rating is an enlisted naval soldier, as opposed to a commissioned officer. They tend to be from lower status backgrounds than officers. A naval rating may proceed up the enlisted ranks to the non-commissioned rank of Petty Officer or Chief Petty officer. In the R.I.N. mutiny, the vast majority of participants were below the rank of Petty Officer.
[2] At the time, discontent was not solely occurring in the Indian Army. Phillip Warner notes that "The causes of grievance were ostensibly slowness of demobilisation" and that "units which had won a high reputation during the war were now disgraced by the activities of an influx of newcomers who had no genuine motivation and no sense of responsibility." P. Warner, Auchinleck: the Lonely Soldier (London: Buchan & Enright, 1981), 196-197.
[3] Free Press Journal, 7 January 1946, 'Indian airmen in city camp on hunger strike,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 43.
[4] Ibid.
[5] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents, (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 60-61.
[6] R. Spector. (1981). "The Royal Indian Navy Strike of 1946 A Study of Cohesion and Disintegration in Colonial Armed Forces." Armed Forces & Society, 7(2), 271-284.
[7] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 62-66.
[8] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 77.
[9] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 78.
[10] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 80-81.
[11] Letter by C.J.E. Auchinleck, C-in-C India, to all Commanding Officers, RIN, IA, RIAF; New Delhi, 1 January 1946, File No. 62/46 NAI, in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 43.
[12] Z.D. Barany, The soldier and the changing state: Building democratic armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas, (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2012).
[13] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 84.
[14] Dutt suggests Auchinleck was scheduled to appear, but Free Press Journal 19 February claims the officer was Flag Officer Commanding RIN John Henry Godfrey. I opt for Auchinleck, as Free Press Journal was reporting on events that transpired more than two weeks in the past, and B.C. Dutt was present at the time. It is possible that Dutt intends to mean Godfrey when he refers to the 'Commander-in-Chief.' 'Indian naval men in city on hunger strike' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 44.
[15] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 86.
[16] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 87.
[17] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 91-100.
[18] S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 42-128.
[19] Various documents, S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 7-41.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Free Press Journal, 19 February 1946, Indian naval men in city on hunger strike,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 44.
[22] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 101.
[23] Free Press Journal, 19 February 1946, Indian naval men in city on hunger strike,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 44
[24] As seen in a photocopy of the Free Press Journal front page found in the front-matter of B.C. Dutt’s Mutiny of the Innocents, 1971.
[25] Anonymous speaker in S. Banerjee, The RIN Strike (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1954, 1981), 17.
[26] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 126-135.
[27] Ibid, 126.
[28] A. Bonner, "The Mutiny of the Innocents" in Averting the Apocalypse: Social Movements in India Today (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 104.
[29] S. Banerjee, The RIN Strike (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1954, 1981), 26.
[30] Free Press Journal, 19 February 1946, 'Indian naval men in city on hunger strike,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 44
[31] S. Natarajan's foreword in B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 7.
[32] Free Press Journal, 19 February 1946, Indian naval men in city on hunger strike,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 45.
[33] Free Press Journal, 20 February 1946, 'City naval strike spreads,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 44
[34] Free Press Journal, 20 February 1946, 'United and discipline should be watchwords,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 46-47.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Free Press Journal, 21 February 1946, 'Delhi naval men fall in line with Bombay strikers,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 47.
[37] Free Press Journal, 25 February 1946, 'All RIAF units in Bombay area on strike,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 59.
[38] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 139.
[39] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 142-143.
[40] S. Banerjee, The RIN Strike (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1954, 1981), 42-43.
[41] Robertson, J. H. (1959). Auchinleck. London: Cassel & Co. Pg 828-829.
[42] Ibid.
[43] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 139.
[44] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 146-160.
[45] S. Banerjee, The RIN Strike (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1954, 1981), 47-61.
[46] Free Press Journal, 22 February 1946, 'All-out offensive planned to crush ratings' revolt,' and 'Several ships at sea in the hands of ratings,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 48-50.
[47] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 149.
[48] Report by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, 3 April 1946, File No. 5/22/46 NAI, in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 40-42.
[49] Free Press Journal, 22 February 1946, 'City Communists call for hartal,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 48.
[50] S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 50-61.
[51] Free Press Journal, 22 February 1946, 'Non-violence commended to RIN men facing fire!' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 50-51.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Free Press Journal, 22 February 1946, 'My services at disposal of RIN,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 54-55.
[54] Free Press Journal, 23 February 1946, 'Demonstrators machinegunned,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 55-56.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Anonymous, November 1988, 'Oral history 10495 with anonymous British Officer serving with 4th and 5th Mahratta Anti-Tank Regiment in India, 1946-1947.' Interviewed by Conrad Wood. London: Imperial War Museum Audio Archives.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Free Press Journal, 22 February 1946, 'Admiral threatens to destroy the navy,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 54.
[60] Both Banerjee's The R.I.N. Strike and Dutt's Mutiny of the Innocents repeatedly state the ratings' wish for a strong, action-minded nationalist leader to guide their hand, and the loss of confidence they experienced when no such leader stepped forward.
[61] Free Press Journal, 23 February 1946, 'Naval ratings agree to surrender arms,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 57-58.
[62] Free Press Journal, 22 February 1946, 'RIN ratings in pitched battle with British,' and 'Hindustan opens fire on Karachi,' 23 February 1946, 'Ratings give up after 25 minute battle,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 89-91.
[63] Extracts from M.K. Gandhi's 'Statement to the Press', 23 February 1946, published in Harijan, 3 March 1946, and reprinted in his Collected Works, Vol. LXXXIII (New Delhi, 1981), 171, in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 59.
[64] Free Press Journal, 25 February 1946, 'Peace can come only when military retire,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 55-56.
[65] Statesman, 23 February 1946, 'Less than 12,000 men involved in RIN mutiny,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 55-56.
[66] Free Press Journal, 26 February 1946, 'It was undeclared martial law,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 61-62.
[67] ibid.
[68] Extracts from a letter by M.R. Jayakar to T.B. Sapru dated Bombay 27 February 1946, File No 807; M.R. Jayakar Papers (1946) NAI in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 55-56.
[69] S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A biography, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1976).
[70] Pg 63-64.
[71] Pg 65-67. Excerpted articles from People's Age, 3 March 1946.
[72] Secraphone message received by Intelligence Bureau, Home Dept., Government of India, from CIO Bombay at 3.40p.m. on 22 February 1946, File No. 5/21/46 (Political) Dept., Govt. of India, NAI in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 82.
[73] Telephone message received by Intelligence Bureau, Home Dept., Govt. of India, from 'Mr Simms' at 1245hrs on 23 February 1946, File No. 5/21/46 (Political) Dept., Govt. of India, NAI in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 83.
[74] Secraphone message received by Intelligence Bureau, Home Dept., Govt. of India, from , from CIO Bombay at 9:30a.m. on 23 February 1946, File No. 5/21/46 (Political) Dept., Govt. of India, NAI in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 83.
[75] A.P. Wavell & P. Moon, Wavell: the viceroy's journal (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 211-212.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid, 215.
[79] Ibid, 217.
[80] J. Baker, ParaData, 'HMIS Hindustan incident,' http://www.paradata.org.uk/content/hmis-hindustan-incident.
[81] Extracts from a telegram by the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Bombay, to Private Secretary to the Viceroy,. on 1 July 1946, File No. 21/8/46 (Political) Dept., Govt. of India, NAI in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 116.
[82] Letter by A.D.F. Dundas, Secretary, War Department, Govt. of India, forwarding a message from C.J.E. Auchinleck, Commander in Chief in India, to G.E.B. Abell, Private Secretary, Viceroy; dated 3 July 1946, File No. 21/8/46 (Political) Dept., Govt. of India, NAI in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 116-117.
[83] Z.D. Barany, The soldier and the changing state: Building democratic armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas, (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2012), 245-274.
[84] V. Chibber, Locked in place: State-building and capitalist industrialization in India (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2006).
[85] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 237.
Mutinies, as a political problem, represent a loss of control within the military's strict hierarchical structure, and signal a danger to the state's ability to control its armed forces. They typically occur on a small scale, and during times of low morale. Rarely, mutinies spill into significant bloodshed, such as the Indian revolt of 1857. In terms of character and danger to the state, the RIN mutiny of 1946 more nearly approached the Invergordon mutiny of 1931, wherein roughly a thousand low ranking British sailors refused to work due to an impending pay-cut of twenty-five percent. In both Invergordon and Bombay, the mutineers edged closer to an industrial strike rather than a violent insurrection. Whereas the Invergordon mutiny involved critically important vessels such as the Hood and the Nelson, the RIN mutiny mainly took place on shore establishments, though once again with low ranking ratings[1] leading the way. Most of the mutineers intended the strike to redress relatively minor grievances; nationalist aspirations represented a secondary concern. The mutiny of 1946, nevertheless, threatened the British with the loss of control over forces that played a crucial role in British victories in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe during the Second World War. The Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, Claude Auchinleck, and the naval chain-of-command responded firmly to the mutineers and demanded their peaceful capitulation. Violence within the ranks never amounted to more than a handful of casualties. Most of the bloodshed surrounding the mutiny occurred in the streets of Bombay during a Communist hartal. Seeking to rekindle a close relationship with the British raj, the Muslim League and National Congress repudiated the Communists and the hartal, and strongly advised the naval ratings to surrender. The firm opposition to any violence surrounding the mutiny pointed the way towards an independent India in which civilian government maintained a steady hand on the reins of military power.
Congress and the Muslim League used the mutiny to enhance their reputation as legitimate purveyors of liberal justice and liberal values, intent on working within a constitutional framework to establish Indian independence. They created political space between their own left-wing contingents, and the actions of the Communists. The Communists viewed the RIN mutiny as an opportunity to drive Indian independence in a more revolutionary direction; they called for a Bombay-wide hartal in support of the mutineers. For a short time, the Communists garnered widespread support from Bombay students and workers, regardless of religious affiliation. Hundreds died in clashes with police and soldiers; police stations burned, buses overturned, and life ground to a halt. Congress and the Muslim League quickly distanced themselves from the Bombay hartal and the RIN mutiny. Consequently, however, they also distanced themselves from the mass demonstrators that responded to the Communist call for action. Congress leaders, including the socialist-leaning Jawaharlal Nehru and capitalist-leaning Sadar Vallabhbhai Patel, made no attempt to lead the students, workers, and naval ratings to revolutionary victory. Congress and the Muslim League left the Communists out in the cold, but at the cost of turning off the heat lamp for the demonstrators as well. United Hindu-Muslim political demonstrations became a dull instrument for social change; future demonstrations lacked a united Hindu-Muslim front, and became increasingly communal in character.
Early Signs of Dissension within the Ranks
There were clear signs of military discontent in the months leading up to the strike of the naval ratings.[2] In Bombay, the Free Press Journal reported that tensions arose at a Royal Indian Air Force camp between airmen and the camp commander over the wearing of civilian clothes in the dining facility.[3] On a more serious note, American journalists reported the desertion of hundreds of Indian soldiers in Indonesia, where "British troops [were] disgusted with the dirty work of shooting Indonesian patriots."[4] Both these events occurred in an atmosphere already fraught with tension due to the impeding court martial trials for the soldiers of the Indian National Army (INA). The INA consisted of Indian-born British soldiers captured by Japanese forces, who then volunteered in small numbers to turn their arms on the forces of the British Empire. The 1945 death of INA leader Subhas Chandra Bose left the INA rudderless, but not politically defenseless--recently released Congress leaders rallied to protect the soldiers of the former president of Congress. This show of support for the INA helped set the stage for the coming RIN mutiny. INA soldiers and Quit India participants were considered heroes in the streets of urban India. Loyal members of the armed forces were considered boot lickers.[5] Impending demobilization and high civilian unemployment created an atmosphere of increasing tension within all branches of the Indian military, but especially in the newer, less conservative branches, the navy and the air force.[6] These tense conditions stacked atop the racial discrimination that was always at play in the armed forces. The British soldiers received better pay than the Indian soldiers, and they received better food and facilities. When the Indians protested, their officers invited them to gamely accept the difference in treatment as a competition between rival military units. The officers prodded the Indian ranks to prove they could do more with less; the efforts of the soldiers, the officers suggested, would result in equal treatment after the next training exercise--or failing that, the next battle--or if nothing else then after the war. Equality became an ever-receding goal line, and the Indians could never cross it.[7] Frustration simmered throughout the Second World War, and boiled over in 1946.
The tension found clearest expression at a moderately-sized naval base that housed and trained signal operators along the shores of Bombay. One of those operators was D.C. Butt, an aspiring nationalist and five-year veteran of the Royal Indian Navy. At the end of the war, he found himself redeployed to the very naval establishment where he had received his initial training: the HMIS Talwar. He was frustrated with the discrimination he had encountered throughout the war. He met many a kindred spirit in the Talwar canteen. "Without quite realising it," he later wrote, "I became a conspirator."[8] Dutt and his friends secretly assumed the name Azad Hindi (Free Indians) in a nod to both the INA (Azad Hind Fauj) and the Indian nationalist movement in general. During its brief four month existence, the circle of conspirators never grew beyond a dozen sympathizers and twenty regulars.[9] But they eventually managed to have an outsized impact on the Royal Indian Navy.
The first act of Talwar sabotage came on Navy Day, 1 December 1945. The RIN commanders wanted to open Talwar to the public for the first time in history. But on the morning of 1 December, officers found the parade ground "littered with burnt flags and bunting; brooms and buckets were prominently displayed from the masthead. Political slogans in foot-high letters were staring from every wall: 'Quite India', 'Down With the Imperialists', 'Revolt Now', 'Kill the British'."[10] The officers and petty officers cleaned the Talwar as best they could before the public arrived. The mild success of the vandalism (and the weak response of the officers) left the small group of conspirators hungry for more.
The weakness of the response came in part due to the military's awareness of changing political conditions throughout India. Commander-in-Chief Auchinleck had rung in the New Year with a letter to all commanding officers wherein he implored them to remember the importance of cooperation between India and Britain, and the need for a smooth changeover to self-rule; he also emphasized the need for tolerance, equality, and goodwill between service members, all of which could provide a 'firm base' for the transition.[11] Auchinleck may not have liked the idea of letting go of India, but he took steps to prepare his military as best he could. This was partly to ensure the stability of a critical British interest. But stability and tolerance would also pave the way for British officers to continue to serve in the independent Indian Army--a hope which eventually came to fruition.[12] In the near-term, however, it perhaps placed his commanders on uneasy grounds for enforcing discipline. Unable to catch the guilty party, and unwilling to castigate the mass of sailors, the officers simply increased the pace of demobilization, effectively hoping to push the conspirators overboard before they could cause any more trouble.[13] The conspirators thus rapidly dwindled in number, but those remaining (including B.C. Dutt) remained enthusiastic for nationalistic action.
As it happened, Auchinleck[14] was scheduled to visit the HMIS Talwar on 2 February 1946. As is often hoped for among general officers, the men at Talwar were, ironically, thrilled at the prospect of Auchinleck's visit. The possibility of being in the presence of their C-in-C emboldened B.C. Dutt and his fellow conspirators to take strong action. Sentries, however, barred the path of any unified vandalism. Thus the conspirators operated in even smaller groups than before, but still succeeded in their task. At dusk on 1 February, naval ratings quickly painted 'Jai Hind' and 'Quit India' on the platform from which Auchinleck was to take the Talwar's salute.[15] In the middle of the night, B.C. Dutt added a few smaller slogans. Then he used a bottle of glue to paste leaflets on barrack walls. In a touch that spoke to the complexity of RIN culture, the leaflets quoted the Bible. "No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other; or else he will hold to the one and despise the other," Mathew 6:24.[16] The sentries discovered the vandalism before sunrise. B.C. Dutt was caught with glue on his hands, and the bottle and leaflets in his pockets. "My locker was opened for inspection," Dutt recalled. "[The officers discovered] mimeographed copies of 'Indian Mutiny, 1857' by Asoka Mehta, my diaries, the copies of the leaflet I had distributed and some incriminating letters." In the history of mutinies, never had the clumsy guilt of the mutineer appeared so naively innocent.
B.C. Dutt's almost comical capture soon resulted in unintended consequences for all involved. The capture transformed a bashful conspirator into a reckless catalyst. He claimed sole credit for all acts of vandalism. He announced his status as a political prisoner. He demanded a bench to rest on, and a chair to sit on. In quick succession, he faced down five interrogating officers, including a Rear-Admiral.[17] Outside of Dutt's confinement cell, the vandalism continued. And on 8 February, Commander King, the British officer in command at Talwar, lost his cool when he heard naval ratings "catcall some WRINs (Women in the RIN)." King lashed out at his men. The context for King's anger appears in Dutt's memoir, but drops out of the news reports (and official reports) appearing in the Towards Freedom collection.[18]
Meanwhile, people were dying in the streets of urban India. In New Delhi, Calcutta, and Bombay, massive marches continued to celebrate the soldiers of the INA, and nationalist leaders continued to harangue the British efforts to punish the offenders. That winter, the ratings made their mark with glue and paint, while the nationalist leaders made their mark with words. But the civilians of India painted the streets with their own blood in scores of clashes with the British authorities.[19] And for the first time, the ratings were about to touch that blood with their own hands.
The Strike Begins
And so the true spark for the naval mutiny began on 8 February, and not on a ship, but upon the shore establishment Talwar. As eventually reported in the Free Press Journal on 18 February, the “insulting behavior” of Commanding Officer King infuriated the naval ratings under his command with taunts of "Sons of Coolies" and "Sons of Bitches."[20] Anger accumulated, and a hunger strike commenced on 18 February.[21] Dutt's memoir adds the phrase "Sons of bloody junglees."[22] Embarking on a hunger strike, the ratings embraced tactics favored in the nationalist movement. Now the officers on Talwar took the strike seriously, and quickly minimized the risk of violence and confusion through the disbursement of non-striking personnel away from the establishment.[23] What began at Talwar quickly spread throughout the harbors of Bombay. Some of the most significant actions took place at Castle Barracks, one of the shore establishments located near the Talwar. On the morning of the 19 February--the same day on which Whitehall announced a Cabinet Mission to India--the Castle Barracks ratings received newspaper accounts of the strike from the Free Press Journal. They saw B.C. Dutt on the front page. The headlines read “Indian Naval Men in City on Hunger Strike;” “Insulting Behavior of C.O. Infuriates the Ratings;” “Authorities Get Panicky;” and “Communications between Indian and Abroad Dislocated”[24] The newspaper accounts set off arguments among the ratings. Interestingly, the poor quality of their breakfast seemed to arouse the strongest sentiment. The navy offered them “just what we have been eating ever since we joined the service—foul-smelling, half-cooked and full of stones and husks”[25]. The ratings rejected the meal, and took action. They seized vehicles and spilled into the streets of Bombay. Some drove, some ran, some marched. All headed towards the Talwar. Their momentum drew 3,000 ratings together. The ratings took a largely non-violent approach to the mutiny. They even formed a Central Naval Strike Committee in anticipation of negotiations. B.C. Dutt assumed a supporting role on the committee.[26] All the members were under twenty-six years of age.[27] Some were Muslims, other Hindu.[28] At the conclusion of the initial meetings and rallies at Talwar, the naval ratings dispersed, and for the most part returned to their ships and shore establishments.[29]
The committee quickly generated a coherent list of demands. These demands suggest the precipitating conditions that led to the strike. First, they demanded the release of all political prisoners, to include the soldiers of the INA. Second, unspecified action against Commander King for ill-treatment and insulting language. Third, the speedy demobilization of RIN personnel, but with provisions for peacetime employment. Fourth, a revision of pay-scale, such that RIN personnel earned as much those in the regular Royal Navy. Fifth, adjusted pay allowances for family and children. Sixth, better food. Seventh, no refund of clothing kit at the time of discharge--in other words, allow the ratings to keep all their uniforms upon completion of their service. Eighth, better treatment from the officers. Ninth, withdrawal of Indian forces from Indonesia.[30]
Wider political concerns bookended the demands, but the core of their concerns regarded equality of pay between the Royal Navy (RN) and the Royal Indian Navy, as well as direct address to the needs of the Bombay shore establishments. The strikers refused to negotiate without the intervention of nationalist leaders, especially Aruna Asaf Ali, a popular Bombay political leader, and the wife of Asaf Ali, a man who figured to become the first Defense Minister in the new Indian government.[31] The ratings broadcast their action to ships throughout the Bombay area. At the end of 18 February, some 1,100 men on the establishment had joined the strike.[32] The next day, eleven additional shore establishments also joined the strike. The ratings boarded the twenty-some naval ships in Bombay, and flew the Indian tri-color flag rather than the Union Jack.[33] This brought the total number of ratings involved to around 20,000, though some estimates place the actual number of strikers at a much lower number—perhaps fewer than 15,000. Thus, a strike that began with a handful of veterans quickly spread to thousands. Many of these were raw recruits.
Aruna Asaf Ali, a member of Congress whom the strikers cited as their preferred correspondent from the nationalist movement, responded in due course. On 20 February she saluted the ratings for refusing to “submit sheepishly [to] the hectoring and swearing of their British rulers."[34] Confident of broad support for the strike, she encouraged the ratings to maintain their stance, seek further guidance from nationalist leaders, and undertake disciplined collective action. “Firmness, discipline and unity on the [part] of the strikers and the pressure of public opinion should result in a successful conclusion to this spontaneous strike."[35]
The ratings adhered to Aruna Asaf Ali’s guidelines for discipline and collective action--at least for the time being--but the political context darkened even as more military personnel fell in with the strikers. Some eighty ratings specializing in signal communications joined the strike from the naval headquarters in New Delhi on February 20.[36] Members of the Royal Indian Air Force joined in the strike on the 21st.[37] The air force strikers repeated the RIN demand for equal pay to that of the RAF. Nevertheless, "the heady wine of freedom had run down noticeably" among the naval units of Bombay.[38] The strikers notified the Free Press Journal that they feared the government intended to deprive them of food. (Apparently the hunger-strike was stopped soon after it began on the 18th, or else not widespread.) In a move that initially baffled the ratings, FOCRIN John Henry Godfrey, admiral, offered to accept the ratings' "request" for better food.[39] The authorities even dropped off a truck of food at Castle Barracks.[40] Yet at the same time, General Sir Rob Lockhart, leader of Southern Command, assumed responsibility for subduing the mutiny. He deployed Indian troops--a battalion of the Mahratta Regiment--to herd the mutineers off the streets and into their quarters.[41] No one was hurt on the first day of Lockhart's operation, but that would soon change.[42] Through runners and telephone calls, the ratings began to discover that "their heroes, the leaders of the liberation movement, had no use for them."[43] The ratings in Bombay grew apprehensive as British Indian Army soldiers formed pickets around their facilities. Still, the Central Strike Committee relayed to their comrades that they should remain non-violent.
B.C. Dutt, S. Banerjee, British military reports, and Indian government reports all differ as to who exactly made the next move; but in all versions, violence occurred at Castle Barracks.[44] [45] According to official reports (which most nationalist leaders accepted), ratings at Castle Barracks attempted to break through Lockhart's picket on 21 February. The pickets repulsed the ratings, and the ratings took up arms and fired on the pickets. The pickets--Army trained--fired back at the naval ratings with rifles, Lewis Guns, and Tommy Guns. Both sides tossed grenades.[46] According to Dutt and Banerjee, the violence began with a prepared assault against the ratings. With the onset of violence, the Central Strike Committee moved from the Talwar to the HMIS Narbada, a sloop, and the most modern ship in the harbor at that time. The committee told all ships to prepare, if necessary, to take up battle stations throughout Bombay. They sent the message without using any attempt at code. The British easily intercepted the message.[47]
National Politics, Local Consequences
The ratings expected broad support from the leaders of the Indian independence movement, but that support never fully materialized. From Congress and the Muslim League, the ratings only received words of sympathy and promises of legal assistance. Demarcating the severe limits of support for the RIN uprising required a test in the streets, newspapers, and radio programs of Bombay. The Communists pushed for just such a test. As in Calcutta one month prior,[48] the street demonstrations that ostensibly supported the revolutionary action of nationalist soldiers soon burned bright-red as the Communists rallied the urban masses towards their own vision of an independent India.
Tensions within Congress, and between Congress and the Communists, soon became apparent. Gangadhar Adhikari, a member of the Communist Party's Central Committee, called for a one-day general strike "in all shops, schools, colleges, and mills as a mark of ... disapproval of Government repression ...."[49] But even as the Communists called for hartal, Congress leaders like S.K. Patil, Mohatma Gandhi, and Vallabhbhai Patel appealed for peace, order, and normalcy.[50] Patil, General Secretary of the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee (BPCC), led the local chamber in passing a resolution in support for the RIN ratings. The BPCC stayed in constant contact with the ratings, and urged the authorities to redress their concerns. Yet at the same time (and on the same day as Adhikari's call for hartal) he noted that "some interested persons, wanting to take advantage of the situation or incapable of realising the consequences of their action, have asked the mills in the city to close as a part of general hartal;" he counseled Bombay that such actions did harm than good.[51] "It is our sad experience every time, that when the atmosphere is tense the hartals or the general suspension of business accentuate the tension rather than relieve it, and they afford an excellent opportunity to hooligans and irresponsible elements to intimidate people and lead them to violence..."[52] Congress knew that the raj was on the way out, and that they had an opportunity to play a decisive role in the transfer of power. Congress in 1946 could ill afford a military-led insurrection that might cost them their place at the negotiating table, or a delay of the transfer. Nor could Congress risk the annoyance (or the destruction) of the Indian capital that formed their base of support. The sudden burst of patriotism from the mutinous, low-ranking ratings came too late in the raj's lifespan to convince the Congress leaders of its good effects. After all, the ratings, however low-ranking, were an integral part of the war machine that kept Gandhi, Nehru, and Patel in prison throughout much of the war. From the Muslim League, Jinnah offered his services to redress the grievances of the RIN strikers, but on the condition that they adopt "constitutional, lawful and peaceful methods."[53] Jinnah, and his rivals in Congress, saw little use in calling for hartal or any other popularly-charged sign of support for the naval ratings.
Regardless of the calls of Congress and the Muslim League, a hartal commenced throughout Bombay. Violence followed. The headline in the Free Press Journal read, 'Demonstrators Machinegunned.'[54] The disruptions began on Thursday evening, 22 February, and continued through the next day. Demonstrators set fire to military and police vehicles, constructed roadblocks, and turned over tramcars. Eventually, military rule prevailed throughout the city, but not without opening fire on the crowds with heavy machineguns. The hartal choked the life out of the city, at least for a day, and the streets "presented a desolate and forlorn appearance" with the exception of a rare passing demonstration made of students and laborers. Rioters looted government shops, as well as those of wealthy merchants, such as a wine shop in Cheera Bazar.[55] Thousands of clerks from the Great Indian Peninsula railway walked out in the early afternoon and joined the mill workers and other laborers in the streets.[56] An intelligence report on the following day placed the number of injured in the Bombay riots at 777, with 63 dead; the police also suffered casualties; 37 officers and 93 constables were injured, and two of the constables were killed.
The oral history archives at the Imperial War Museum in London include an account of the street violence from an anonymous, low-ranking British officer who considered himself a socialist.[57] He travelled to Bombay in civilian clothes in hopes of seeing a revolution; after seeing the mutinied ships quietly lining the harbor, he travelled deeper into the streets to be among the crowds of protesting workers. Shortly after his arrival a British Army fifteen-hundred weight truck came around a corner--the protestors threw themselves to the ground and a machine-gun from the back of the truck opened up. Many were wounded, but the officer, as the only white man among the crowd, began to fear a retaliatory lynching, and so he took a train to Sandhurst Rd, near the Communist Party headquarters. As the crowds passed down Sandhurst Rd, the people shouted 'Jai Hind' and 'Ink Zal Ind-Ibd'--Long Live the Revolution. "Talking to the comrades during the afternoon and evening ... they were wondering if this might be signal for revolution." Mutiny played a large role in "communist romanticism," reaching back to the uprising aboard the Russian battleship Potemkin in 1905. The police, in the officer's view, were not making a serious effort to stop the demonstrations, "So it was not inconceivable that a Soviet might be declared and that Bombay might have been in the hands of revolutionary forces and that this might have spread to the whole of India and who knows what might have happened."[58] What in fact actually happened was that Indian National Congress leaders decided that the prospect for revolution must not get out of hand.
As the violence in the streets wound up, the naval ratings wound down. On 22 February, Admiral Godfrey, commander of the Royal Indian Navy, demanded their surrender; he suggested that he would annihilate the RIN rather than let it fall into chaos.[59] The ratings realized that no significant national leader supported their efforts in an unconditional way. They had stumbled into the fight for Indian independence with naive expectations, and now they found they had little stomach for truly radical politics. When their Central Strike Committee failed to produce a national leader that could unequivocally guide the fight, the ratings lost confidence and enthusiasm.[60] Thus, back at the naval yard, the ratings at Castle Barracks surrendered their arms in accordance with the wishes of Vallabhbhai Patel. They attempted to renew the strike on a non-violent basis, and paid their respects to "those brave citizens and workers who have perished or have been injured... at the hands of the British authority."[61] The mutiny also reared its head in Karachi and Calcutta, but was quickly contained in similar fashion.[62] Soon, all the ratings capitulated. Those that played a key role in the strike, like B.C. Dutta, were eventually discharged from the navy, never to return, and never pardoned.
If the ratings found scant hope from the Bombay riots, most nationalist leaders found none at all. Mahatma Gandhi denounced the violence as unholy, even if it represented a united Hindu-Muslim action against the British forces. "A combination between Hindus and Muslims and others," he wrote on 23 February, "for the purpose of violent action is unholy and will lead to and probably is a preparation for mutual violence--bad for India and the world."[63] Not everyone agreed with the Mahatma. Aruna Asaf Ali pushed back against Gandhi on 25 February. She insisted that she would only help bring disturbances to an end if the British military forces withdrew from the city, and the government lifted the ban on meetings.[64] In the halls of the Central Assembly, Congress leadership shuffled the question of enquiries into subcommittees and out of the main chamber; they refused to even address the possibility of refuting any disciplinary actions taken against the mutineers.[65]
With the ratings losing enthusiasm for revolutionary action, the Communist Party quickly sensed the closing of a small window of opportunity. Shripad Amrit Dange, a founding member of the Communist Party in India, alleged a systematic cover-up by the government. He said the violence in the streets of Bombay constitutes "an unprecedented orgy of shootings... even for the British administration of this country."[66] He charged the British with the mass shooting of 250 civilians during the Bombay hartal. He made out the shootings as a class issue, and said they mostly took place in working class areas. "One can understand the Government and its spokesmen raising the cry of hooliganism; but it is distressing to find Congress leaders like Sardar Patel lending support to this interpretation."[67]
Thus far, the difference in action between the Congress and Communists seem clear-cut. But this was not the case. The Towards Freedom collection juxtaposes S.A. Dange's criticisms of Congress with a private letter from Dr Mukund Ramrao Jayakar that offers a local reading of political tensions. In the letter, Jayakar, a member of the Constituent Assembly in India, explained to INA defense lawyer Tej Bahadur Sapru that the disparate actions of the Communists and Congress leaders divulged the presence of subtle nationalist power struggles. "There is a secret rivalry between the Communists and Congressmen," he wrote, "each trying to put the other in the wrong. In yesterday's speech Vallabhbhai almost said, without using so many words, that the trouble was due to the Communists trying to rival the Congress in the manner of leadership."[68] The Communists sought to rally support for the mutineers with a broad call for hartal throughout the city of Bombay. The Communists used the hartal in an attempt to pry the support of the masses away from the hands of Congress. They wagered that initiating a politically potent hartal might grant them enough political momentum to drive the independence movement leftward. Patel, however, firmly repudiated the hartal, and instead concentrated even more political power in the direction of capital-friendly Congressmen. Nehru's biographer, S. Gopal, noted that Patel grew annoyed when socialist-leaning Jawaharlal Nehru came to Bombay to look into the riots for himself.[69] British bureaucrats and Indian business leaders both preferred the orderly calls of capital-friendly Patel to the immoderate fires of revolutionary socialism. Patel's influence proved strong enough to wrestle left-leaning Congress leaders into line, and he effectively discouraged them from showing any support for the actions of the Communists, the rioters, or the ratings. In short, despite the burnt vehicles, tram shelters, and post offices, and despite the massive movement of students and labor, the Communist hartal effectively solidified the collusion between a moderated Congress, Indian capital, and the British government. This was the absolute opposite of the intended effect. Jayakar's letter continued with a celebration of Congress' turn against the naval strikers. "I feel often surprised at the wonderful change which has come over these big Congressmen. No hartals, no meetings[,] no processions, no closing of schools, no defiance... even the Mahatma now says that it is foolish to distrust the intentions of the British."[70] In noting the "secret rivalry" between the Congressmen and Communists, Jayakar actually expected the Communists to make political gains in national politics due to Congress' apparent meekness. These gains never materialized. The Communists continued to excoriate Congress and the British military for their actions against both the naval ratings and the people of Bombay, but to no effect.[71] The Communist denunciation of the Patel-organized surrender also seems to have had no effect.
The view from the Raj
Intelligence bureau reports from the time period show the typical government employee only too happy to distinguish between Communist violence and Congress' moderation. But the political fallout remained uncertain until the smoke cleared. "Congress were against today's hartal and Vallabhbhai Patel was emphatic about this," wrote one intelligence officer, "but the Communists' call for sympathy with the RIN ratings has won the day and the Congress Labour Union has been totally ineffective."[72] A telephone report the next day drew a clear line between Communist and Congress: "Congress advised against the hartal yesterday. The communists however called for hartal and sent representatives distribution leaflets... there is no doubt that the Communists are directly responsible for the trouble."[73] The intelligence reports failed to mention Congress member Aruna Ali Asaf's support for the hartal. Yet any successful mobilization of labor proved short lived. The government curfew on 22 February effectively put an end to the rioting and violence, as well as to any working-class collective action.[74]
Up at the very top, Viceroy Archibald Wavell took the mutiny in stride. Before the onset of the strike, the INA riots in Calcutta on 12 and 13 February firmly held his attention.[75] Wavell described 19 February as "a day of alarms but not excursions."[76] Wavell felt that Auchinleck took the news harder than himself. "Though [Auchinleck] talked about sticking to our principles, he was really hoping hard that I would give a lead to recommend to H.M.G., surrender to public opinion and total abandonment of I.N.A. trials. I refused to play and said we should stick it out. What a cheerful day--prospect or reality of three mutinies and two strikes! However, I got in 18 holes of golf with Pompey Howard in between and played well."[77]
On the 20 February neither Wavell nor Auchinleck acknowledged any interest in giving way to the naval ratings; they hoped to severely punish the ringleaders of the mutiny; they had yet to discover that the mutiny was largely rudderless. When the mutineers fired on their troops, Auchinleck and Wavell coolly refused the notion of any parley with the mutineers.[78] After two months marked by violence throughout the country, Wavell wrote on 27 February of his frustration with Indian political leaders for inciting mass action in the past, but showing little ability to control it in the present. "They have often condemned 'police rule,' but it is at any rate better than student rule or mob rule, as they are beginning to find out."[79]
As winter passed into spring, and spring into summer, the military locked up the 'ringleader' naval ratings, discharged others, and forgave the remainder. It reclaimed nearly all its vessels (and most of its equipment) intact. An exception was the sloop HMIS Hindustan, which had exchanged fire with Indian Army howitzers and required serious repairs.[80] In July the Bombay government advised against public trials of the mutineers. The trials, they felt, would strain the ability of capitalist-minded Congressmen to "maintain ascendency over Congress Socialists who are at present bitterly critical of Vallabhbhai Patel and others for lack of support to the RIN mutineers. Public trials will give Congress Socialists an opportunity to strengthen their influence and this may make future negotiations for Congress participation in Central Government more difficult."[81] Also in July, freshly promoted Field Marshal Auchinleck softened his approach to the RIN participants. Falling in line with Bombay's advice, he opted for the more private (and less stringent) punishments made possible through summary proceedings, rather than the harsher prospects of court martial. He made one exception--Commander King, the commanding officer at Talwar that used racist language, would still undergo court martial for his use of unbecoming language, and his failure to investigate a complaint when brought to his notice.[82]
Conclusion
The mutiny of the naval ratings burst upon the scene of national politics unexpectedly; it set off unintended reverberations that lasted for years. From one perspective, the affair ended tidily, and possibly eased fears of an internal security dilemma within independent India. From another, however, the RIN mutiny put a firm wedge between organized labor and Congress, thereby spoiling the economic plans of Indian socialists for years to come. The RIN mutiny of 1946 thus helped shape conditions depicted in two recent works of outstanding scholarship; each examines different aspects of India's political development: Zoltan Barany's The Solider and the Changing State and Vivek Chibber's Locked in Place. The findings of the present study indicate that neither developmental outcome stemmed from strategic choice, but through happenstance.
Barany argues that Indian democracy benefited from Jawaharlal Nehru's relatively smooth assumption of executive military command at the time of the transfer of power. The Indian Army, still an elite and disciplined force, calmly moved from one master to the next. But this outcome was far from certain prior to the mutiny. The military and Congress, after all, distrusted one another tremendously after standing on opposite sides throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Their opposition to one another hardly represented a promising start for civilian dominance over military affairs, itself an essential precondition for democracy. Curiously, the mutiny played a large role in ensuring civilian dominance over the military. As previously stated, a mutiny represents a threat to a government's ability to control its armed forces. In the case of the 1946 mutiny, however, the actions of Congress and the raj helped cement civilian dominance over military matters, and ensured the welfare of officers in the Indian military. Congress leaders like Patel and Gandhi sought to end the mutiny merely because it represented a threat to the progress of near-term negotiations between Congress and the British government. To ensure the fidelity of a transfer of power, they strove to use their leverage as national leaders to encourage the mutineers to a peaceful, negotiated settlement. The mutineers wanted active leadership, but instead received quiet advice. The mutineers claimed they were behaving in a politically legitimate way; Congress leaders coolly denied the claim. This set a precedent that held strong throughout the subsequent tumultuous decades: in the early years of independent India, military units were not welcome to take independent political action of any kind, thus mitigating their threat to the state. [83]
Second, Congress refused to support the hartal of workers and students; Congress' refusal staunched the confidence of labor-based political actors in India. Indian capital, already strengthened from their output throughout the Second World War, embraced Patel's willingness to quickly end the strike of the naval ratings. In Patel, the capitalists found a leader capable of speaking directly to strikers; Patel was equally capable of keeping the other Congress leaders from going too far in their support of movements that tasted of revolutionary socialism. But Patel's diffusion of the RIN mutiny eventually had far reaching consequences; when it came time to implement Nehru's economic plans, India lacked the confident working class necessary to provide leverage vis-a-vis domestic capital. Congress' actions during the 1946 mutiny, though only intended to ensure a rapid transfer of power, therefore had serious influence on economic outcomes for decades to come.[84]
As D.C. Butt reflected in his own memoirs some forty years ago, "Indian society has so evolved that there is no room for revolution." Indeed, for that fact, fans of moderation might wish to thank an unlikely (and unlucky) group of young men: the Royal Indian Navy mutineers of 1946.[85]
*Afterword: Following his release from jail, D.C. Butt tried to obtain service in the newly independent Indian navy. The navy remembered the blows it took on the chin, and declined his admission. Thereafter, he served as a journalist with the Free Press Journal for many years, and then moved on to advertising. All writers, I think, are either failed revolutionaries or failed sailors at heart; D.C. Butt was both.
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Wavell, A. P. W., & Moon, P. (1973). Wavell: the viceroy's journal. London: Oxford University Press.
Warner, P. (1981). Auchinleck, the lonely soldier. London: Buchan & Enright.
[1] A rating is an enlisted naval soldier, as opposed to a commissioned officer. They tend to be from lower status backgrounds than officers. A naval rating may proceed up the enlisted ranks to the non-commissioned rank of Petty Officer or Chief Petty officer. In the R.I.N. mutiny, the vast majority of participants were below the rank of Petty Officer.
[2] At the time, discontent was not solely occurring in the Indian Army. Phillip Warner notes that "The causes of grievance were ostensibly slowness of demobilisation" and that "units which had won a high reputation during the war were now disgraced by the activities of an influx of newcomers who had no genuine motivation and no sense of responsibility." P. Warner, Auchinleck: the Lonely Soldier (London: Buchan & Enright, 1981), 196-197.
[3] Free Press Journal, 7 January 1946, 'Indian airmen in city camp on hunger strike,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 43.
[4] Ibid.
[5] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents, (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 60-61.
[6] R. Spector. (1981). "The Royal Indian Navy Strike of 1946 A Study of Cohesion and Disintegration in Colonial Armed Forces." Armed Forces & Society, 7(2), 271-284.
[7] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 62-66.
[8] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 77.
[9] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 78.
[10] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 80-81.
[11] Letter by C.J.E. Auchinleck, C-in-C India, to all Commanding Officers, RIN, IA, RIAF; New Delhi, 1 January 1946, File No. 62/46 NAI, in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 43.
[12] Z.D. Barany, The soldier and the changing state: Building democratic armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas, (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2012).
[13] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 84.
[14] Dutt suggests Auchinleck was scheduled to appear, but Free Press Journal 19 February claims the officer was Flag Officer Commanding RIN John Henry Godfrey. I opt for Auchinleck, as Free Press Journal was reporting on events that transpired more than two weeks in the past, and B.C. Dutt was present at the time. It is possible that Dutt intends to mean Godfrey when he refers to the 'Commander-in-Chief.' 'Indian naval men in city on hunger strike' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 44.
[15] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 86.
[16] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 87.
[17] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents. (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 91-100.
[18] S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 42-128.
[19] Various documents, S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 7-41.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Free Press Journal, 19 February 1946, Indian naval men in city on hunger strike,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 44.
[22] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 101.
[23] Free Press Journal, 19 February 1946, Indian naval men in city on hunger strike,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 44
[24] As seen in a photocopy of the Free Press Journal front page found in the front-matter of B.C. Dutt’s Mutiny of the Innocents, 1971.
[25] Anonymous speaker in S. Banerjee, The RIN Strike (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1954, 1981), 17.
[26] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 126-135.
[27] Ibid, 126.
[28] A. Bonner, "The Mutiny of the Innocents" in Averting the Apocalypse: Social Movements in India Today (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 104.
[29] S. Banerjee, The RIN Strike (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1954, 1981), 26.
[30] Free Press Journal, 19 February 1946, 'Indian naval men in city on hunger strike,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 44
[31] S. Natarajan's foreword in B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 7.
[32] Free Press Journal, 19 February 1946, Indian naval men in city on hunger strike,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 45.
[33] Free Press Journal, 20 February 1946, 'City naval strike spreads,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 44
[34] Free Press Journal, 20 February 1946, 'United and discipline should be watchwords,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 46-47.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Free Press Journal, 21 February 1946, 'Delhi naval men fall in line with Bombay strikers,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 47.
[37] Free Press Journal, 25 February 1946, 'All RIAF units in Bombay area on strike,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 59.
[38] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 139.
[39] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 142-143.
[40] S. Banerjee, The RIN Strike (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1954, 1981), 42-43.
[41] Robertson, J. H. (1959). Auchinleck. London: Cassel & Co. Pg 828-829.
[42] Ibid.
[43] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 139.
[44] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 146-160.
[45] S. Banerjee, The RIN Strike (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1954, 1981), 47-61.
[46] Free Press Journal, 22 February 1946, 'All-out offensive planned to crush ratings' revolt,' and 'Several ships at sea in the hands of ratings,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 48-50.
[47] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 149.
[48] Report by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, 3 April 1946, File No. 5/22/46 NAI, in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 40-42.
[49] Free Press Journal, 22 February 1946, 'City Communists call for hartal,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 48.
[50] S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 50-61.
[51] Free Press Journal, 22 February 1946, 'Non-violence commended to RIN men facing fire!' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 50-51.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Free Press Journal, 22 February 1946, 'My services at disposal of RIN,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 54-55.
[54] Free Press Journal, 23 February 1946, 'Demonstrators machinegunned,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 55-56.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Anonymous, November 1988, 'Oral history 10495 with anonymous British Officer serving with 4th and 5th Mahratta Anti-Tank Regiment in India, 1946-1947.' Interviewed by Conrad Wood. London: Imperial War Museum Audio Archives.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Free Press Journal, 22 February 1946, 'Admiral threatens to destroy the navy,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 54.
[60] Both Banerjee's The R.I.N. Strike and Dutt's Mutiny of the Innocents repeatedly state the ratings' wish for a strong, action-minded nationalist leader to guide their hand, and the loss of confidence they experienced when no such leader stepped forward.
[61] Free Press Journal, 23 February 1946, 'Naval ratings agree to surrender arms,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 57-58.
[62] Free Press Journal, 22 February 1946, 'RIN ratings in pitched battle with British,' and 'Hindustan opens fire on Karachi,' 23 February 1946, 'Ratings give up after 25 minute battle,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 89-91.
[63] Extracts from M.K. Gandhi's 'Statement to the Press', 23 February 1946, published in Harijan, 3 March 1946, and reprinted in his Collected Works, Vol. LXXXIII (New Delhi, 1981), 171, in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 59.
[64] Free Press Journal, 25 February 1946, 'Peace can come only when military retire,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 55-56.
[65] Statesman, 23 February 1946, 'Less than 12,000 men involved in RIN mutiny,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 55-56.
[66] Free Press Journal, 26 February 1946, 'It was undeclared martial law,' in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 61-62.
[67] ibid.
[68] Extracts from a letter by M.R. Jayakar to T.B. Sapru dated Bombay 27 February 1946, File No 807; M.R. Jayakar Papers (1946) NAI in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 55-56.
[69] S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A biography, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1976).
[70] Pg 63-64.
[71] Pg 65-67. Excerpted articles from People's Age, 3 March 1946.
[72] Secraphone message received by Intelligence Bureau, Home Dept., Government of India, from CIO Bombay at 3.40p.m. on 22 February 1946, File No. 5/21/46 (Political) Dept., Govt. of India, NAI in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 82.
[73] Telephone message received by Intelligence Bureau, Home Dept., Govt. of India, from 'Mr Simms' at 1245hrs on 23 February 1946, File No. 5/21/46 (Political) Dept., Govt. of India, NAI in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 83.
[74] Secraphone message received by Intelligence Bureau, Home Dept., Govt. of India, from , from CIO Bombay at 9:30a.m. on 23 February 1946, File No. 5/21/46 (Political) Dept., Govt. of India, NAI in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 83.
[75] A.P. Wavell & P. Moon, Wavell: the viceroy's journal (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 211-212.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid, 215.
[79] Ibid, 217.
[80] J. Baker, ParaData, 'HMIS Hindustan incident,' http://www.paradata.org.uk/content/hmis-hindustan-incident.
[81] Extracts from a telegram by the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Bombay, to Private Secretary to the Viceroy,. on 1 July 1946, File No. 21/8/46 (Political) Dept., Govt. of India, NAI in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 116.
[82] Letter by A.D.F. Dundas, Secretary, War Department, Govt. of India, forwarding a message from C.J.E. Auchinleck, Commander in Chief in India, to G.E.B. Abell, Private Secretary, Viceroy; dated 3 July 1946, File No. 21/8/46 (Political) Dept., Govt. of India, NAI in S. Sarkar, ed., Towards Freedom: Documents on the movement for Independence in India, 1946, part 1 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 116-117.
[83] Z.D. Barany, The soldier and the changing state: Building democratic armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas, (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2012), 245-274.
[84] V. Chibber, Locked in place: State-building and capitalist industrialization in India (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2006).
[85] B.C. Dutt, The Mutiny of the Innocents (Bombay: Sindhu Publications, 1971), 237.